Some
reflections on anticipatory systems
After reading the
book of prof. Robert Rosen
Anticipatory Systems.
Phylosophy, Mathematical & Methodological Foundations
Pergamon
Press, 1985
24 March 1989
Dear prof. Rosen,
I happen to have read your book "Anticipatory Systems".
I find the reading extremely interesting.
I am not a biologists. I am a physicist
by training, and my career developed into industrial research. I
now retired, but I indulge cultivating some scientific speculative
interests.
I have been always struck by the similarity
existing in the dynamic behavior of very different systems, from
biology, to epistemology, to technology. The similarity with
biological evolution have been recognised by scholars of other
fields, like Karl Popper when dealing with the problem of progress
in science (dynamics in the world of scientific ideas). On may
part, I tried to utilise the similarity to speculate on the
progress in technology (dynamics in the world of products).
I have been however very cautious in doing this
since it seemed to me that using the behaviours observed in one
field to get hints or explain behaviours in a completely different
field could only be considered having heuristic value.
I appreciated therefore on your book first of
all the epistemological foundations you give to the use of
metaphor. Secondly, I found that the metaphor of anticipatory
systems helps illuminating some aspects of the dynamics of
technology.
To show how stimulated I was from reading your
book, I jotted down in the attached memo, some first and very
course reflections.
I will certainly very much appreciate your
reactions if you will have the time and patience to go through
them.
In any case I am anxious to get track of your
further work on the subject of anticipatory systems and receive
copy of available papers.
Sincerely yours
Ugo L. Businaro |
24 March 1989
1) System failures
A product is conceived to satisfy a certain
basic need. Automobile satisfy the need of transport.
However, together with the basic need there are many others more or less
important needs (explicit or implicit) which the product also
satisfy.
The success of a new product, or of a new model of an
old product, depends therefore an how it is able to satisfy the complex
whole of such needs.
Usually a new model has a lifetime. During the course
of its life it might have been produced in millions of units. The
experience from the markets are normally fed back into the manufacturing
process so that the quality of the product increases during its lifetime
as a function of the number of units produced. At a certain moment,
however, the sales start to decline and the model is substituted by a
new one.
This is clearly a case of system failure since
the products - at the moment it is substituted - is still able to
perform the mission it was designed to, and even better than the first
unit produced.
In the case of automobile, the average lifetime
in Europe of a new model is of approximately 10 years during
which it will have gone through 2 or 3 major "restyling" and
few more "face-lifting". The new model that replace the old
one at the end of lifetime is usually completely different from the old
one (at least if one considers it from the stand point of the production
lines which are normally completely new and have required very large
capital investments).
The metaphor of the anticipatory system can help in
understanding such a behaviour.
The designer, when conceiving a new car, could take
care explicitly of the basic needs, which goes into the list of
technical specifications of the project. Often the characteristic of the
project that respond to such basic needs are not changed with respect to
the previous model. The designer, however, has to be able also to
respond to others less explicit components of the global complex set of
needs. Here is where one can distinguish (a posteriori, from the
market success of the model) from excellent, good and less good designs.
The metaphor suggests that a designer should have in
mind an anticipatory model (partly implicit) of the market
and of the user, which includes also user's tastes and idiosyncrasies,
fashion effects, prevailing culture, etc. He uses such a model when
deciding on the design variables. At the end, the effect of the user's
model is frozen in the design. The new model, when it first appears on
the market, hopefully better responds to the user's needs and tastes
than the older ones on the market. As the time pass, however, the needs
or the tastes of the users change and the product less and less respond
to them. To increase the product lifetime, "rejuvenation" is
tried (face-lifting and restyling). When there is no more space for
rejuvenating actions, the model is retired from the market and
substituted with a new one. The death of a product model is
therefore caused by the increased inability of the designer's anticipatory
model frozen in the project to predict the user's needs and tastes.
2) Interacting qualities of the environments
It is interesting to note that in the USA (at least
before the Japanese "invasion") a different approach was
followed by car-manufacturers. The lifetime cycle of the new car model
is planned to be much shorter (one year), but limiting the change
in the "new year" model to very superficial aspects (requiring
only few modifications on the production lines).
How the different approach in USA and Europe could be
interpreted in term of phenotype, genome, environmental qualities?
The different approach could be explained, firstly, in
term of an existing difference in the environmental qualities
representing the needs to be satisfied by the product in Europe and in
USA. The selection process therefore will operate on different parts of
the total produce genome.
One could however question whether the different
approach is really due to different environments or simply to
different strategies of adaptation to environmental selection. In the
latter case one should expect that the different subdivisions of the set
of environmental qualities (the subset of those qualities which affect
the product genome and the subset of all the others) will have different
longer term effects in the two cases.
One could moreover think that it is possible to
subdivide the set of environmental qualities in a more fine way: the
subset of the qualities having a strong impact on the product (first
order interaction), the subset of those having less strong impact
(second order interaction), and so on, down to the subset of those
qualities having negligible impact.
Different design strategy are then conceivable: one
could decide to deal with the first subset only, or with the first and
the second subsets, and so an. Accordingly, different genotype variables
should be considered as affected. Correspondingly, different will be
change in phenotype from one product model to the next.
With the first design strategy (considering only the
first subset of environmental qualities) one could accept a shorter
lifetime of the product, but with a less costly change in the phenotype.
(The subsequent worries will be on how long one could defer the
necessity to take into considerations also the - in the meantime
built-up - effects of the second order qualities). With the choice of a
different strategy (taking into consideration more than one subset of
environmental qualities) one could hope to have a longer lifetime even
if the change in the new product phenotype will be much more expensive.
The anticipatory mode built-in In the product
in the two cases are different because they extend the predictions to
different qualities of the environment. Keeping "dormant" the
higher order qualities will depend from competition from other
manufacturers. The Japan "invasion" in USA might have
accelerated the need to extend the qualities to be included in the
design strategy by USA manufacturers (however I had no occasion to
examine recent market data in USA to find confirmation).
It will be interesting to know whether there are
evidence of similar different cases of adaptation strategy from biology.
3) The constraints from genome
architecture
The strategy that a manufacturer can adopt with
respect to market has however to be compatible with internal constrains
from technology. In fact a product like a car is very complex, as it is
made of subsystems and components each one having different
"lifetime". To give an idea, a new motor in Europe usually is
designed to last at least 20-30 years (being produced in tens of
millions of units before leaving place to a new motor). The basic
reasons is the huge capital investments needed far manufacturing a new
motor. (A second reason might be that the environment selection that
operates on the whole car is less effective an the motor).
One could therefore consider that a designer is free
to use only some of the genotype variables when designing a new product.
The normal constrains with which the designer has to live are some time
indicated referring to the existence of a technological regime.
The innovation process during a prevailing regime is characterised by
being more process than product oriented and in general being the
summation of small steps.
However there are times when parts of the genome which
was considered as fixed are changing and the designer have a larger
freedom available to change the phenotype of the product. When such a
time arrives one sees a larger innovation revolution in the product
design. In the industrial history, "waves" of innovations have
been detected related to different technological regimes.
The analogy with biology here is the recognised
importance of constrains from genome architecture due to past evolutions
and the "waves" of innovation corresponding with the emergence
of a new biological type with respect to a new genus, family or species.
Assuming a common metaphor far biology and technology
dynamics, the observation of the latter could provide interesting
information because of its much shorter time scale. The amount of data
collected (and evaluated referring in one way or the other to the
biological evolution metaphor) is now impressive (see, e.g., C.
Marchetti, Techn. Forecast. Soc. Change, 23, 3, 1983).
4) Refinement of the anticipatory system metaphor
It might therefore be interesting to try to refine the
metaphor of the anticipatory system assuming that there is a
"structure" not only in the environment (see the preceding
section), but also in the genome.
A start in that direction is in the earlier Rosen
paper on. "Dynamic similarity and the theory of biological
transformations" (Bull. of Math. Biology, 40, 1978). There, a
distinction is made between fundamental and derived variables in the
equation of state of a given system.
The subdivision of the genomic variables into
fundamental and derived ones, gives already some interesting idea far
the technology case. So, to make just an example, the base materials
used in a product could be considered as a fundamental genomic variable
on which the product market selection does not intervene.
According to the remarks In the Rosen paper, the change in the base
material (e.g. composite materials in aircraft or in car) should push to
change the product phenotype to maintain optimality of the design with
respect to selection. Not always however this is what is done by the
designer which tries instead to keep the change within the existing
phenotype (material substitution in components). This might be the
reason for the slowness in taking advantage of the potentiality of the
microelectronics revolution in car design (limiting its use the
"gadgets", without changing more drastically other product
characteristics).
The importance of the above problem to better
understanding the technological dynamics is such that I am very much
interested to know any progress done in the refining of the anticipatory
system metaphor.
On this respect it might be interesting to try to find
correlations with ideas developed by W. Stegmüller (The Structure and
Dynamics of Theory, Springer Verlag, 1976) in a quite different contest.
In this work, Stegmüller contributes to solve the dispute between
Popper and Khün an the concept of normal science. The dispute is on how
a normal scientist can keep holding a theory even when
"falsified" by experiments.
The solution proposed by Stegmüller is first to
recognize that the concept of falsification for a formal theory is not a
proper one: a formal theory has a field of truth which is intrinsic in
its assiomatic definition and in its production rules. (Already here
there might be a correspondence with the fact that in an anticipatory
system - predicting without feedback the future of a system - it is
improper to talk of errors when a difference emerge between prediction
and reality).
Then Stegmüller distinguish in a formal theory of
physics between a frame, a core and an expanded core. When
comparing theory predictions with experiments the scientist is therefore
provided with a certain degree of flexibility: he can change the
expanded core of the theory without having to touch the core itself.
The work of Stegmüller is quite formal and it is
difficult for me to appreciate the details of the reasoning. It might
however be interesting to try to make a more detailed comparison with
the model theory in the Rosen book to see if the structured flexibility
of the Stegmüller theory concept could be applied to the modelling
theory.
5) Definition of lifetime
I have some difficulties in understanding the concept
of lifetime defined in term of divergence beyond a certain (arbitrarily
chosen) value between the model predicted behaviour and the real system’s
one. Could one instead, far a given system, fix intrinsically a
threshold beyond which the approximation is no more acceptable so to
cause the system failure?
As a matter of fact, in the case of a car new model,
the lifetime is not fixed, but actually depends an the decision of the
producer to stop or not production because of the reduced sales. In the
biological case the process of death of a species - where there
is not such a decidor - could perhaps be conceived as a
fuzzy event more than a sudden catastrophe (with population decreasing
an a more or less long period of time up to complete extinction).
For the individual organism however the concept is
more difficult to grasp. One possible way out is the following. The
environmental qualities are usually spanned continuously over certain
ranges. Because of this, one could expect that the ecological niches of
the species exploiting one basic environmental quality be either
covering the entire range of the quality or, on the contrary, be very
finely subdivided. These alternatives are however not the case both in
biology and in the world of products. In fact, the market is usually
subdivided into a discrete and limited number of separate segments. Some
one has found a kind of rule of thumb valid far the separation of
biological niches as well as far the products: the average distance of
two successive niches is approximately equal to the square root of 2
(see the ratios between the radius of bicycle’s wheel).
A complex system which Is subject to environmental
selection is therefore not only spanned with respect to the time
variable, but also with respect to environmental variables. One should
deduce from this that a complex system is realized with a certain
built-in flexibility which permit to "survive" in an
environment with-changing qualities up to a certain amount.
This flexibility might now define an intrinsic value of acceptability of
difference between actual environment changes and the prediction of the
anticipatory model built in the system. As the time pass, there is a
drifting in the value of the environmental qualities. When such a drift
brings the value of the environmental qualities beyond the acceptable
range (due to the flexibility) the system is no more apt for survival.
At this point one could ask whether such built-in
flexibility could not be enough to explain the time spanning behaviour
of a complex system. What is the added value of the anticipatory model?
Possibly, the existing of such a feature acts an the
system by causing the moving of the "centre of gravity" of the
range of acceptable value according to the predicted average change of
the environmental qualities. The lifetime is, also in this case, an
abrupt event which happen when the drifted values of environmental
qualities go beyond the range of acceptable values by the shifted
capability range of the system.
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